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1 Introduction
The last forty years have seen a number of proposals to approximate corpo-
rate tax bases and tax rates in Europe in order to level the playing field for
business competition. A recent report by the European Commission on the
future of company taxation in Europe (Commission of the European Com-
munities, 2001), points out that diﬀerences in national corporate tax systems
aﬀect location decisions of firms, impose barriers to cross-border investments,
impair the eﬃciency in the capital market, and foster international tax plan-
ning.1 To remedy these problems the Commission argues that there is a need
for coordination of corporate tax systems among EU member states. The
Commission’s report shows that there is large variation in eﬀective corporate
tax rates across EU member states due to tax rate and tax base diﬀerentials.
The Commission’s main proposal is to move towards a consolidated tax base
for European multinational companies, to be allocated across member states
through a formula apportionment system. This proposal entails a certain
degree of tax base harmonization. The alternative road ahead pointed out
by the Commission, is one of harmonization of national tax bases and tax
rates within the current system of corporate taxation systems among the EU
member states.2
The need for a level playing field in the European Union has also been
highlighted recently by the entry of new EU member states whose eﬀective
tax rates often are significantly below those of ’old’ member states. Illus-
trative of the problem is Nicolas Sarkozy (French Secretary of the Interior
and at the time minister of finance and economic aﬀairs) who proposed to
refuse payment of most EU-subsidies (i.e., from Structural Funds) to the new
EU-countries, whose eﬀective tax rates are significantly below EU-average,
in order to prevent their tax advantage from creating “excessive” tax com-
1For a survey of proposals and the recent, so-called Bolkestein-report of the EU see
Devereux (2004), Mintz (2004) and Sørensen (2004).
2Mintz (2004) argues that the focus should be on tax bases rather than tax rates.
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petition.3
This paper argues that the discussion over tax rates and base approxima-
tion has overlooked the eﬀects harmonization of tax bases or tax rates may
have on the stability of international cartels. We show that harmonization of
tax rates may increase or decrease collusive behavior, but that the most likely
outcome is that it reinforces incentives to stay in cartels. Furthermore, any
type of harmonization of tax bases is always undesirable from society’s point
of view, but bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse
than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.4 The implication
of our analysis is that, on the one hand, there are very clear negative eﬀects
of harmonization on collusive behavior, but on the other hand, there are ben-
efits of a level playing field for corporate taxation systems. A full analysis of
corporate tax reform needs to address these eﬀects in a unified framework.
This is a topic that is left for future research.
Collusive behavior in an international setting has been confirmed by
a number of studies and many of these are summarized in Haufler and
Schjelderup (2004). In short, international collusive behavior has been es-
tablished in industries such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, cars, diamonds,
telecommunications, uranium yellowcake, Canadian potash, cement, plastic
pipe, electronics, and wood pulp.5 Cooperation within these industries in-
volves price fixing schemes that in some cases have been going on for a
decade or more. The costs of such activities, as documented in the empirical
literature, are substantial.6 The potential damage to the economy by car-
tels has been highlighted in Monti (2001); ”Estimations by the OECD in
3See, e.g., Financial Times Deutschland, September 7, 2004, and Neue Züricher Zeitung,
September 8, 2004. Countries like, i.e., Lithuania and Hungary have lowered their (eﬀec-
tive) tax rates to 13% resp. 16% in order to attract multinationals from established member
states.
4The latter approach has been adopted by the EU in its eﬀorts to harmonize commodity
taxes. See Haufler and Schjelderup (2004) for an analysis.
5See Haufler and Schjelderup (2004) for a survey.
6See e.g., Slade (1995), Scherer (1996), King (1997) and Steen and Sørgard (1999).
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its recent Report on Hard Core Cartels7 have provided dramatic figures.
The average increase from price fixing is estimated to amount to 10% of the
selling price and the corresponding reduction of output to be as high as 20%.
In some recent big cases prices have been increased by the cartel participants
by 30% to 50%.”8
The fighting of cartels has been a clear priority of the European Com-
mission. It is therefore a paradox that no link has been made to the possible
eﬀects of tax harmonization on collusive behavior in the Commission’s re-
ports on corporation tax systems.
The issue of tax harmonization has been discussed extensively in the pub-
lic finance literature in relation to fiscal externalities between countries. The
canonical tax competition model predicts that competition among countries
over mobile capital leads to too low tax rates and underprovision of public
goods in equilibrium.9 From this model follows the policy recommendation
that tax coordination or harmonization is desirable in order to correct the
fiscal externality from competition. However, this view is challenged by the
Public Choice literature. Here the argument is that competition in general,
and competition among governments in particular, is beneficial because it re-
duces government waste and disciplines politicians.10 These studies, however,
do not have competition and collusive behavior as their focal point.
Related to our study is Gendron (2001) who in a closed economy set-
ting analyzes the eﬀect on collusion of alternative loss oﬀset provisions under
the corporation tax. He finds that an increase in refunds of tax losses may
enhance collusive behavior. More recently, Haufler and Schjelderup (2004)
analyze the choice of international tax principle in commodity taxation and
how it aﬀects cartel stability. Their results are in line with the results pre-
7OECD 2000.
8The industries involved are graphite electrodes and citric acid.
9See the seminal papers by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). A
survey of the literature is given in Wilson (1999).
10E.g., Brennan and Buchanan (1980), McLure (1986), and more recently Rauscher
(1998).
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sented in this paper. They find that tax harmonization strengthens collusive
behavior irrespective of commodity tax principle in place. To our knowledge
there are no other studies that are directly comparable to ours or to the
Haufler and Schjelderup study.
Our results are brought forward by using a standard model of dynamic
price competition and tacit collusion.11 The framework is a two-country, two-
firm setting, where the national product markets are of equal size and costs of
production are the same for both firms in order to highlight how diﬀerences
in national tax systems aﬀect the stability of cartels. Section 2 outlines the
model and section 3 analyzes cartel stability. Section 4 investigates the eﬀects
of bilateral and unilateral tax harmonization, while section 5 discusses the
robustness of results and section 6 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider two firms, labelled by i ∈ {1, 2}, which are located in country 1
and 2, respectively. They produce amounts xi of an identical and homogenous
good, and tacit collusion between the two firms implies that both firms refrain
from exporting. Each firm is thus a monopolist in its home market. In each
period, either firm may defect from this implicit agreement and export to the
other market, but such action will cause future retaliation by the other firm.
If firm i defects, it does so in the first period (t = 0) by exporting to country
j. It will catch firm j by surprise and we define this as the deviation phase of
the game. In the following period(s), however, firm j retaliates by exporting
to market i. This is the punishment phase of the game. Furthermore, as in
the literature on repeated games we assume a trigger strategy which implies
that firm j will retaliate by exporting to market i in all subsequent periods.
11The same model has previously been used to study ‘reciprocal dumping’ in a trade
context (see Pinto, 1986), to compare tariﬀs and quotas (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1989),
to study the eﬀects of trade liberalization as in Lommerud and Sørgard (2001), and to
compare diﬀerent exchange rate regimes (Meckl, 1996). Recently, Haufler and Schjelderup
(2004) have studied how international principles of value-added taxation aﬀect the stability
of collusive agreements.
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Hence, if one firm defects in period t = 0, duopoly competition prevails in
both markets in t = 1, 2, ...∞. Furthermore, we assume that national markets
are segmented, i.e., diﬀerent producer prices can be set in the two national
markets under both monopolistic and duopolistic market structures.
In the following, we denote by πMi the profit of firm i if it acts as a
monopolist in its domestic market, πEi is the extra profit in period 0 when firm
i defects and exports into the other market, and πDi is the total duopoly profit
(earned in both markets together) of firm i under mutual export competition.
Denoting δi as the discount factor of firm i (0 < δi < 1), defection from the
cartel solution is unprofitable whenever the present value of staying in the
cartel forever, πMi / (1− δi) , is greater than or equal to the profits of defecting
from the agreement, that is, (πMi + π
E
i ) + π
D
i δi/ (1− δi). Thus, we can write
the “stability condition” for the collusive agreement as:
θi ≥ θ¯i =
πEi
πMi − πDi
, ∀ i ∈ {1, 2}, (1)
where θi ≡ δi/(1− δi) is the relative discount factor of firm i, and θ¯i is the
size of this rate that just leaves the firm indiﬀerent between staying in the
secret cartel and defecting.
It is worth pointing out that we cannot rule out the case πMi < π
D
i for
one of the firms we consider. In this case it would always be profitable for
this firm to leave the cartel, since it would gain in both the deviation and the
punishment period. The focal point here, however, is on how corporate tax
policy aﬀects the stability of cartels and for the analysis to be meaningful in
this sense, we will have to rule out this case and assume that πMi > π
D
i .
The critical value θ¯i diﬀers between the two firms (as will become clear
later) due to diﬀerences in the corporate tax system. In general, it is the firm
with the higher critical value of θ¯i, which is more likely to break the collusive
arrangement, since it is this firm’s θ¯i that is binding for the stability of
the cartel.12 For the analysis to come, it is useful to note that the higher
12As pointed out by Haufler and Schjelderup (2004): If firm j has the higher critical
value of θ¯, then firm i (i 6= j) could improve the stability of the collusive agreement by
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θ¯i is under a given scenario, the lower is the likelihood that the collusive
agreement is stable, since a smaller range of (common) relative discount
factors θ sustains the cartel solution.
3 Profits and cartel stability
In this section we focus on diﬀerences in national tax parameters and how
they aﬀect the stability of the cartel. To that end we shall assume that the
size of the market in each country is the same and that firms have the same
costs. Demand functions in both markets are linear and given by xi = a−pi,
where pi is the consumer price, xi is demand, and a > 0 is a market size
parameter that denotes maximum sales at a price of zero which is identical
for both countries.13
The economic profit of the firm is
πˆi = pixi − cxi, i = 1, 2.
where c is (constant) marginal cost.
We assume that taxable profit diﬀers from economic profit in order to cap-
ture the idea that tax deductible costs in practice deviate from true costs.
The deviation may be given various interpretations. First, it is a fact in many
countries that certain categories of costs are not tax deductible. Notable ex-
amples are alcoholic drinks and bribes. Second, and more importantly, the
dividing line between what is deemed an expense - which can be deducted
oﬀering firm j a new contract (for example a fifty-fifty split of the two markets). Such
market sharing, however, poses a problem. The reason is that it is much easier to detect a
breach of agreement if a firm exports (when it should not) than if it produces beyond the
agreed export quota. The cost of monitoring, therefore, provides cartels with an incentive
to set up exclusive territories (see Marvel, 1982, and Tirole, 1988, pp. 183 and 185).
13In principle we could allow market size diﬀerences, but the purpose here is to inves-
tigate the eﬀects of diﬀerences in corporate tax systems only, and we therefore refrain
from analyzing the interaction of taxes with other parameters. The eﬀect of diﬀerences in
market size and costs on cartel stability is examined in Haufler and Schjelderup (2004) in
a context of commodity taxes.
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immediately - and what is deemed an investment, which is written oﬀ over
time, is based on judgement that may not reflect the true economic cost.
Third, one may also consider incomplete cost deductions as a proxy for the
distortion imposed on firms by the inability of governments to set tax de-
ductible depreciation rates equal to true depreciation rates.14
Taxable profit is given by
πˆτi = pixi − γicxi, i = 1, 2.
where γi is the share of marginal costs that is tax deductible. In principle
γi R 1, so if γi < 1, deductions are incomplete in the sense that deductions
fall short of true costs, whilst if γi > 1 deductions are too generous. Only
when γi = 1 are tax deductible costs equal to true costs and the corporate
tax system is neutral (i.e., does not aﬀect firm behavior).
Denoting ti as the corporate tax rate, the per-period profits of firm i in
its home market are then
πi = πˆi − tiπˆτi = (a− pi) [pi (1− ti)− c (1− γiti)]
= (1− ti) (a− pi)
∙
pi − c · 1− γiti
1− ti
¸
. (2)
When each firm is a monopolist in its home market, maximization of (2)
either with respect to price (as here) or quantity, yields monopoly price and
quantity as well as the corresponding per-period monopoly profit in the home
market as follows
pi =
(a+ c˜i)
2
, xi =
(a− c˜i)
2
, and πMi =
1− ti
4
α2i , (3)
where c˜i (γi, ti) ≡
1−γiti
1−ti c ≡ ²ic is the eﬀective after tax marginal cost and
αi ≡ (a− c˜i) > 0 for positive sales to occur. Note that ²i is a tax wedge. If the
tax code allows full deductibility of costs (γi = 1) we have that ²i = 1, and
14The latter problem is well known in public finance and has various eﬀects on firm
behavior. See Sinn (1987).
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c˜i = c. The corporate tax rate is then a tax on pure profit and does not aﬀect
the behavior of the firm. In general we shall make the common and very
reasonable assumption that tax authorities do not have perfect information
about the true costs of depreciation.15 Thus the neutrality property will in
general not hold.
From (2) it follows that the tax code in fact implements two taxes. First,
we have a tax on pure economic profits with tax rate ti. Second, there is a
tax on costs with tax rate τ i = ²i− 1. When γi > 1 this implies a subsidy on
costs while the opposite is true if 0 < γi < 1.
For ease of exposition we sometimes refer to a situation where a country
is a low tax country. By this we mean:
Definition 1 Country i is a low tax country if it has a constellation of tax
rate and tax deductibility rule that makes the firm located in country i a low
cost firm in the following manner: c˜j > c˜i (⇔ ²j > ²i, i 6= j) .
Definition 1 implies a combination of tax rates and deductibility rules
such that either condition (i) or (ii) below is satisfied:
(i) ti ≤ tj and 1 > γi ≥ γj,16 or
(ii) ti ≤ tj and γi ≥ γj > 1, whereby the diﬀerence in tax rates is small
enough or the diﬀerence in deductibility rules is large enough to sustain
²j > ²i.17
In what follows we assume that country 1 is the low tax country and thus
that firm 1 has the lowest eﬀective marginal costs after-tax (i.e., c˜1 < c˜2).
Definition 1 states the conditions for when a country is a low tax country
in the sense that it has the most generous set of tax and depreciation rules.
15The inability of governments to set correct depreciation allowances is one of the major
reasons why corporate taxes introduce a tax wedge. See Sinn (1987) for a discussion.
16Note that ∂c˜i∂γi = −
tic
1−ti < 0, thus an increase in tax deductible costs decreases the
eﬀective cost of the firm for all values of γi.
17These restrictions are necessary because ∂c˜i∂ti =
1−γi
(1−ti)2 c < 0 if γi > 1.
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Since the tax rate interacts with the depreciation allowance in a nontrivial
fashion, it is necessary to be precise in what constitutes a set of favorable
tax parameter values.
3.1 Deviation from cartel agreement
If firm 1 deviates and exports to country 2 in period 1, it sets a price on its
exports equal to its monopoly price in its home market. Since it is firm 1
that is the low cost firm, its monopoly price is below that of firm 2, that is,
p1 =
1
2
(a+ c˜1) < p2. The monopoly price will sweep the market in country 2,
and is also the profit maximizing price for firm 1 as a monopolist in country
2. As a consequence, πE1
¡
= πM1
¢
> πM2 , and the profit from deviating is
πE1 =
1− t1
4
α21. (4)
If firm 2 deviates and exports to country 1, it cannot use its profit maxi-
mizing (monopoly) price since p2 > p1. Therefore, the best strategy for firm
2 is to slightly undercut the price of firm 1 by setting its export price just
below (a+ c˜1) /2 (= p1) , thereby sweeping the market and earning a profit
of18
πE2 =
(1− t2)
4
α1 [α1 − 2 (c˜2 − c˜1)] . (5)
In the punishment phase, both firms compete over prices. Since firm 1
is located in the low tax country it has the lower eﬀective marginal costs
(c˜1 < c˜2) . Thus, it will set its price marginally below the eﬀective marginal
cost of firm 2, that is, c˜2. Since goods are homogeneous, firm 1 is then the
sole provider in both markets, and earns a profit in each country equal to
(a− p1) [p1 (1− t1)− c (1− γ1t1)]. Total profit in both markets corresponds
18This implicitly assumes p1 =
(a+c˜1)
2 > c˜2. If this does not hold, π
E
2 ≤ 0, and the
high-cost firm would never break the cartel agreement, as it cannot gain anything, and
θ¯2 = 0.
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to these expressions multiplied by 2 and can be written as
πD1 = 2(1− t1)α2 (c˜2 − c˜1) .
In contrast, firm 2 derives profit of
πD2 = 0,
in the punishment period.
The critical discount factors for the two firms are
θ¯1 =
α21
α21 − 8α2(c˜2 − c˜1)
, (6)
θ¯2 =
α1 [α1 − 2(c˜2 − c˜1)]
α22
. (7)
Given our assumption πM − πD > 0, we have α21− 8α2(c˜2− c˜1), and θ¯1 is
unambiguously positive. Equivalently, πE2 > 0 implies α1 [α1 − 2(c˜2 − c˜1)] >
0, and hence θ¯2 > 0. Recall form Section 2 that it is the firm with the higher
critical discount factor that is more likely to break the collusive agreement.
The question now is whether this is firm 1 or firm 2. This is the topic for
analysis in the next section.
3.2 National diﬀerences in corporate tax systems
In order to determine which firm is more likely to defect from the collusive
agreement, we compare (6) and (7) and make use of Definition 1. Then:
Proposition 1. It is always the firm located in the low tax country (firm
1) that is more likely to break the collusive agreement.
Proof : From Definition 1 we have that since firm 1 is located in a low
tax country, then, (c˜2 − c˜1) > 0 and α1 = a − c˜1 > a − c˜2 = α2. Thus,
the numerators (Nθ¯i) in equations (6) and (7) relate to each other as follows:
Nθ¯1 > Nθ¯2 . For the denominators Dθ¯1 and Dθ¯2 , we can use α1 = α2+(c˜2− c˜1)
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and binomial rules in the denominator of (6), to get;Dθ¯1 = α
2
1−8α2(c˜2−c˜1) =
[α2 − (c˜2 − c˜1)]2−4α2(c˜2− c˜1), which shows that Dθ¯1 < Dθ¯2 = α
2
2, as c˜2 > c˜1.
Taken together we have thatNθ¯1 > Nθ¯2 andDθ¯1 < Dθ¯2 , which unambiguously
implies θ¯1 > θ¯2. ¤
In fact, it is always the low-cost firm that is more likely to deviate from
the cartel agreement. However, Definition 1 ensures that the low-cost firm
always resides in the low-tax country. Intuitively, a firm located in a low tax
country can gain more than a firm located in a high tax country by defecting
from the collusive agreement. The reason is that its cost advantage implies
higher profit both in the deviation and in the punishment phase of the game.
The low cost firm, therefore, has a smaller range of discount factors (i.e., a
higher relative discount factor θ) that sustains the cartel solution.
4 Tax Harmonization
We start with the same basic premise as in the previous sections namely that
country 1 is a low tax country and firm 1 is a low cost firm. Making use of the
standard definition of tax harmonization we define a harmonizing company
tax reform as one which narrows or eliminates the diﬀerence between tax
rates and/or deductability rates. We shall refer to unilateral harmonization
as the case where one country changes its tax parameters to a minimum
standard. Unilateral harmonization has been the vehicle for harmonization
of commodity taxes within the European Union. An alternative is to consider
a bilateral harmonization process where both countries change their tax rates
and/or deductability rules to a common tax and/or deductability rule.19
We examine the eﬀects of harmonization by investigating tax base and tax
rate harmonization separately. This is done in order to: (i) compare bilateral
and unilateral harmonization to see if one is preferable over the other, and
(ii) investigate whether it is better to harmonize tax bases or tax rates.
19Both bilateral and unilateral approaches to harmonization have been studied in the
tax literature. See Kanbur and Keen (1993), and Keen (1987, 1989).
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Underlying the discussion is an implicit view that monopoly and cartels are
undesirable from society’s point of view. With equal weights on consumer
and producer surplus, it is well known that monopoly produces a deadweight
loss that can be reduced by promoting competition.
4.1 Harmonization of corporate tax rates
Bilateral harmonization. Starting from γ1 > γ2 and t1 < t2, bilateral
harmonization of tax rates to a common level implies dt1 > 0 and dt2 < 0,
and we assume that dt1 = t2−t12 and dt2 = −
t2−t1
2
.20 Firm 1 is the most likely
firm to defect from the cartel. Let dθ¯B1 denote the change in firm 1’s critical
discount rate under bilateral harmonization. Then
dθ¯
B
1 =
µ
∂θ¯1
∂c˜1
∂c˜1
∂²1
∂²1
∂t1
− ∂θ¯1
∂c˜2
∂c˜2
∂²2
∂²2
∂t2
¶
t2 − t1
2
. (8)
Although ∂θ¯1∂c˜1 < 0,
∂c˜i
∂²i
> 0, and ∂θ¯1∂c˜2 > 0 (see the Appendix), the precise
eﬀect of the tax rate on the firm’s eﬀective cost depends on the size of the
tax deduction parameter γ, since
∂²i
∂ti
=
1− γi
(1− ti)2
(
> 0 if γi < 1
< 0 if γi > 1
. (9)
Using (8) and (9) we find that
dθ¯
B
1
(
< 0 if γi < 1
> 0 if γi > 1
(10)
When the tax code implies incomplete deductions (γi < 1), bilateral har-
monization stabilizes the cartel. Increasing the tax rate in country 1 raises
eﬀective production costs of firm 1 and narrows the cost diﬀerential between
the two firms thereby reducing the gain to the low cost firm (firm 1) from
20Of course, the eﬀect is qualitatively the same for any dt1 > 0 and dt2 < 0, but this
assumption allows for some analytical simplicity, and for an easy comparison with the
unilateral case.
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defecting. Furthermore, lowering the tax rate in country 2 reduces the profit
of firm 1 in the punishment phase, since the price firm 1 can charge is a
decreasing function of firm 2’s eﬀective costs (c˜2). Thus, the profit of firm 1
also falls in the punishment period. In either case (increasing t1 or lowering
t2), bilateral harmonization when γi < 1 increases the range of discount rates
that supports the cartel solution for firm 1.
In contrast, when the tax deductibility parameter implies a subsidy on
costs (γi > 1), bilateral harmonization destabilizes the cartel. An increase
in the tax rate in country 1 enhances the cost advantage of firm 1 thereby
making it more attractive to deviate. Similarly, a decrease in the tax rate in
country 2 lowers the subsidy to firm 2 and increases its eﬀective costs (c˜2)
allowing firm 1 to earn higher profit in the punishment phase. Consequently,
firm 1 is more likely to break out of the cartel.
Unilateral harmonization. Under unilateral harmonization of corpo-
rate tax rates, only one country changes its tax rate. This is the approach
taken in the European Union on commodity taxation, where the policy has
been to impose a minimum rate that low tax countries must comply with. In
line with this we assume that the low tax country (country 1) must adhere
to a minimum tax rate tmin1 . Given that t1 < t
min
1 < t2 to begin with, country
1 must increase its tax rate to tmin1 whilst country 2 keeps its rate constant.
To make our analysis comparable to the bilateral harmonization above, we
assume that minimum taxation implies an increase in the tax rate of country
1 by dt1 = t2−t12 .
Define dθ¯U1 as the change in firm 1’s critical discount rate under bilateral
harmonization. Then,
dθ¯
U
1 =
∂θ¯1
∂c˜1
∂c˜1
∂²1
∂²1
∂t1
t2 − t1
2
, (11)
where the sign of dθ¯U1 depends on the size of γi. In particular,
dθ¯
U
1
(
< 0 if γi < 1
> 0 if γi > 1.
(12)
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Qualitatively the result is the same as under bilateral harmonization.
Comparing unilateral and bilateral harmonization we know from (10) and
(12) that dθ¯i1 < (>) 0, i = B,U, if γi < (>) 1. In particular,
dθ¯
B
1 −dθ¯
U
1 = −
t2 − t1
2
µ
∂θ¯1
∂c˜2
∂c˜2
∂²2
∂²2
∂t2
¶(
< 0 if γi < 1
> 0 if γi > 1
(13)
Bilateral harmonization strengthens the collusive agreement more than
unilateral harmonization when γi < 1, whilst bilateral harmonization weak-
ens the cartel more than unilateral harmonization when γi > 1. Based on
(8), (11), and (13) we may draw the following conclusions:
Proposition 2. Bilateral and unilateral harmonization of corporate tax
rates strengthens (weakens) collusive behavior if tax deductible costs are below
(above) true economic costs. Bilateral harmonization strengthens the cartel
solution more than unilateral harmonization when γi < 1, whilst bilateral
harmonization weakens the cartel solution more than unilateral harmoniza-
tion when γi > 1.
Intuitively, when γi < 1, bilateral harmonization to a common rate elim-
inates the tax rate diﬀerential between the two countries. The incentive to
defect for the firm located in the low tax country is then only provided by the
more generous depreciation allowance. This is not the case under unilateral
harmonization where the tax rate diﬀerential is narrowed but not eliminated.
In this case both the rate and the base diﬀerential contribute to the cost ad-
vantage. This logic can be reversed and applied to the case γi > 1.
4.2 Harmonization of tax bases
Bilateral harmonization. We now consider the case of tax base harmo-
nization from the starting point t1 < t2 and γ1 > γ2 with firm 1 as the
low-cost firm. Bilateral harmonization to a common rate implies as before
that dγ1 = −
γ1−γ2
2
< 0 and dγ2 =
γ1−γ2
2
> 0, and the change in the critical
15
discount factor is
dθ¯
B
1 =
µ
−∂θ¯1
∂c˜1
∂c˜1
∂²1
∂²1
∂γ1
+
∂θ¯1
∂c˜2
∂c˜2
∂²2
∂²2
∂γ2
¶
γ1 − γ2
2
(14)
Using (see the Appendix) ∂θ¯1∂c˜1 < 0,
∂c˜i
∂²i
> 0 and ∂θ¯1∂c˜2 > 0, (14) and
∂²i
∂γi
= − ti
1− ti
< 0 for all ti ∈ (0, 1), (15)
we have that
dθ¯
B
1 < 0. (16)
Harmonizing tax bases bilaterally makes collusive agreements more stable,
since it eliminates the diﬀerence in tax bases and thus shrinks the cost ad-
vantage of the low cost firm. This has the eﬀect of reducing profit of firm 1
in both the deviation and the punishment phase.
Unilateral harmonization. Under unilateral harmonization there is a
binding ceiling for depreciations implemented by γ2 < γ
max < γ1. If we
again assume that the ceiling, γmax, is the mean of the tax parameters, γ1
and γ2, this requires a change in the low-tax country tax base according to
dγ1 = −
γ1−γ2
2
. This changes the critical discount factor of firm 1 as follows
dθ¯
U
1 = −
∂θ¯1
∂c˜1
∂c˜1
∂²1
∂²1
∂γ1
γ1 − γ2
2
< 0. (17)
From the comparative static result above, it is clear that harmonization of
the tax base even to a minimum level stabilizes the cartel, since profits in
both phases when the low cost firm breaches the agreement fall. Comparing
bilateral and unilateral harmonization by taking the diﬀerence of (16) and
(17) we obtain,
dθ¯
B
1 −dθ¯
U
1 =
µ
γ1 − γ2
2
¶
∂θ¯1
∂c˜2
∂c˜2
∂²2
∂²2
∂γ2
< 0. (18)
It is clear from (18) that bilateral harmonization has a greater impact on
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the critical discount factor, and we may state:
Proposition 3. Both bilateral and unilateral harmonization of tax bases
strengthens incentives for collusion, but the eﬀect is larger under bilateral
harmonization.
Comparing Propositions 2 and 3 it is seen that cartel stability is diﬀerently
aﬀected by tax rate and tax base harmonization. Tax base harmonization
(unilateral or bilateral) always reinforces incentives to stay in the cartel. The
reason is that the cost advantage of the low-cost firm either shrinks (unilateral
harmonization) or vanishes (bilateral harmonization). Thus, profits in both
the deviation and punishment phase fall relative to the profit of being a
monopolist in the home market (cartel solution).
The stability of a cartel under tax rate harmonization depends on the
size of the tax deductibility rate. If γ < 1, the intuition is the same as under
base harmonization. However, if the deprecation allowance is too generous
(γ > 1) it is a subsidy to the firm that is enlarged by the corporate tax rate.
This increases the cost advantage of the low cost firm and leads to higher
profit in the deviation and punishment phases. The eﬀect of this is that the
collusive agreement is destabilized.
If we relax the assumption that marginal cost is identical in both countries
all our results hold and are even enforced if the low cost firm resides in the
low tax country, that is, if ²i < ²j and ci < cj. Crucial for our results then
is that Definition 1 is fulfilled. If the opposite constellation is present, that
is, ²i < ²j but ci > cj, the high cost firm is harmed by harmonization,
since the cost diﬀerential is widened when the low tax country increases
its eﬀective tax burden. Harmonization then delivers a double dividend in
the sense that it enhances competition and weakens the incentive for cartel
formation. However, strong anecdotical evidence indicates that the latter
case is less realistic. Wages and taxes in the Eastern European countries, for
example, are substantially lower than in Western Europe indicating that low
tax countries host low cost firms.
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5 Extensions
In our model we have assumed price competition and homogenous goods.
Allowing diﬀerentiated goods under price competition would increase the
complexity of the model, but would not alter results in a qualitative way.
One might argue that Cournot competition could be used as an alternative
approach. It is worth pointing out that one diﬃculty with the Cournot as-
sumption is that price is determined only indirectly from market demand,
since firms do not directly set their prices. This is one reason why quantity
competition is losing ground in modern Industrial Organization.21 There is
nothing in the analysis, however, that precludes us from testing our results
under Cournot. It turns out that whether we have Cournot or Bertrand com-
petition does not aﬀect our results. A formal analysis that shows this by using
the same tacit collusion model, but analysing commodity taxes, is provided
by Haufler and Schjelderup (2000).
5.1 Several countries
Our analysis can be extended to the case of several countries (i.e., n > 2).
Using the same set-up as above where diﬀerences in the tax system are the
only source of variety, we focus on two cases. In case (i) country 1 is a low-tax
country and there are (n− 1) identical high tax countries. In case (ii) there
are two countries, 1 and 2, hosting firms with an identical low-cost structure,
and (n− 2) countries hosting high-cost firms.
In both cases above, a low-cost firm i earns profit ΠEi = (n − 1)πEi if it
deviates from the cartel and exports to the other (n− 1) countries in period 1.
As in Section 3.1 it catches its competitors by surprise and sets its monopoly
price pi < pj ∀ j, j 6= i in the deviation phase. Profit in the deviation phase
is now (n−1) times higher than previously and ceteris paribus, this weakens
cartel stability. However, there may be an oﬀsetting eﬀect (depending on
assumptions) since there are more firms that can export to the home market
21“After all, firms almost always compete in prices.” (Tirole, 1988, p. 224).
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of the firm that breaches the collusive agreement. As a consequence, profit
in the punishment phase may fall, and ceteris paribus, this eﬀect enforces
incentives to stay in the cartel. Which of these two eﬀects dominates depends
on the relative magnitudes of these eﬀects and diﬀers in cases (i) and (ii).
Case (i). There are (n− 1) identical high tax countries and profit in
each of these countries in the punishment period is (as before) zero, whilst
the low-cost firm earns a positive profit. Profit in the deviation phase for the
low cost firm (firm 1) is ΠD1 = (n− 1)πD1 , and is increasing in the number of
countries. Thus, the critical discount factor of the low-cost firm (denoted Θ
when there are many countries) can be written as
Θ¯i =
ΠE1
πM1 −ΠD1
=
(n− 1) · πE1
πM1 − (n− 1) · πD1
=
πE1
πM1
n−1 − πD1
>
πE1
π1 − πD1
= θ¯1. (19)
It is seen from (19) that the likelihood of firm i leaving the cartel increases
in the number of high-tax countries, since the critical discount factor of the
low-cost firm increases disproportionately to the number of countries. Fur-
thermore, the inequality shows that the discount factor of firm 1 is larger
when there are many countries than in the two country case
¡
Θ¯i > θ¯i
¢
.
Given that it is the firm with the higher relative discount factor that has
the strongest incentive to defect, adding countries makes the cartel more
unstable.
Since marginal cost (c) is the same for both firms a change in c˜i can be
interpreted as the tax system in the low tax country becoming less generous.
The eﬀect of harmonization can then be found by showing how the rela-
tive discount factor changes following an increase in the eﬀective after-tax
marginal cost (c˜i), that is
∂Θ¯i
∂c˜i
= −
2αi
h
α2i
n−1 − 8αj (c˜j − c˜i)
i
+
α2i
n−1 [6αi − 8(c˜j − c˜i) + (n− 2)8α2]h
α2i
n−1 − 8αj (c˜j − c˜i)
i2 < 0.
(20)
Equation (20) shows that the relative discount factor of the firm in the low
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tax country falls, reducing the likelihood of the cartel being stable.
Similarly, a reduction in the eﬀective after-tax marginal cost in the high-
tax country can be interpreted as if the high-tax country makes its tax system
more generous. The eﬀect of this on the incentive to defect is
∂Θ¯i
∂c˜j
=
8α2i [αi − 2 (c˜j − c˜i)]h
α2i
n−1 − 8αj (c˜j − c˜i)
i2 > 0. (21)
which shows that the collusive agreement is weakened. In sum, it then follows
from (20) and (21) that the eﬀects of harmonizing either tax rates or tax bases
are qualitatively unchanged from our previous analysis.
Case (ii). In this case there are two identical low-cost firms and it can
be shown that the relevant critical discount factor changes significantly. The
reason is that in the punishment phase, firm 1, which is assumed to break
the collusive agreement, has to cope with the other low-cost firm and, hence,
the price is driven down to equal the eﬀective marginal cost in all markets
under attack. Thus, profit in the punishment phase will be equal to zero and
we get
Θ¯i =
ΠEi
πMi
= (n− 1) π
E
i
πMi
= n− 1 i = {1, 2}, (22)
where the last step in equation (22) follows since πEi = π
M
i from (3) and
(4). Compared with the original two-country model, the rise in profit in the
deviation phase leads to a higher critical discount factor, whereas the fall in
profit in the punishment phase lowers the critical discount factor
¡
Θ¯i
¢
. The
eﬀect then depends on the relative magnitudes and we cannot determine
these. Furthermore, it means that we cannot compare the discount factor in
equation (22) with the one in (6).
A change in the eﬀective after-tax marginal cost (c˜i) has the following
eﬀect on the discount factor
∂Θ¯i
∂c˜i
= 0 =
∂Θ¯i
∂c˜j
∀i = {1, 2}, j = {3, ..., n}. (23)
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Thus, for a low cost firm, tax harmonization (whether base or rate) does
not aﬀect the decision to leave the cartel. The intuition is that there is al-
ways another identical low-cost firm which faces the same tax rules. Thus,
the change in the critical discount factor is aﬀected only by the number of
countries, since additional profits (proportionally increasing in the number
of countries) only occur in the deviation phase. Hence, we conclude
Proposition 4. Suppose the number of countries increases (n > 2).
(i) If there is one low-tax country and (n− 1) identical high tax countries,
all results from the two-country setting are preserved qualitatively.
(ii) If there are at least two identical low-tax countries and (n−2) high tax
countries, coordination neither in tax rates nor in tax bases has any
influence on cartel stability.
5.2 Transport costs
In the previous analysis we have neglected transport costs. Although trans-
portation costs have declined rapidly the last decade, it is still reasonable
to assume that a firm has higher marginal costs if it exports to other coun-
tries. If we model transport costs (S) as Samuelson shipping costs per unit
exported, firm i has eﬀective marginal costs c˜i in its home market, but incurs
c˜i+ S˜i in the foreign market, where S˜i = ²i ·S = 1−γiti1−ti ·S. The cost advantage
in the low cost country now implies S˜2 > S˜1, since ²2 > ²1.
To keep the model economically interesting, we have to assume that pj =
a+c˜j
2
> c˜i + S˜i > 0. If not, both markets are perfectly segmented and both
firms will be monopolists in their home markets. As long as c˜2− c˜1− S˜1 > 0,
that is, S1 < c˜2− c˜1, our previous analysis does not change qualitatively: it is
still the firm in the low-tax country which is more likely to leave the cartel.
Its critical discount factor can then be shown to take the form
θ¯
S
1 =
(α1 − S˜1)2
α21 − 8α2(c˜2 − c˜1 − S˜12 )− 4S˜2[α1 − 2(c˜2 − c˜1)− S˜2]
. (24)
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Compared to the standard case of no transport costs (S1 = S˜2 = 0), the
introduction of transport costs decreases profits in the deviation phase, but
has an ambiguous eﬀect on profits in the punishment phase. In its home
market, the low-cost firm can set a higher price, whereas in the foreign market
transport costs will decrease profits. Taken together, the overall eﬀect cannot
be signed a priori. However, the eﬀect of tax harmonization on the discount
factor remains qualitatively the same as in the previous analysis, and is, in
comparison to the standard model, even magnified by transport costs because
equation (8) changes to
dθ¯
B,S
1 =
Ã"
∂θ¯1
∂c˜1
∂c˜1
∂²1
+
∂θ¯1
∂S˜1
∂S˜1
∂²1
#
∂²1
∂t1
−
"
∂θ¯1
∂c˜2
∂c˜2
∂²2
+
∂θ¯1
∂S˜2
∂S˜2
∂²2
#
∂²2
∂t2
!
t2 − t1
2
,
(25)
where ∂θ¯1
∂S˜1
< 0, ∂S˜i∂²i > 0, and
∂θ¯1
∂S˜2
> 0. Compared to equation (8) it is seen
that equation (25) has an additional eﬀect (the second terms in the squared
brackets) which strengthens the argument against tax harmonization.
As shown above, as long as c˜2− c˜1− S˜1 > 0 our previous analysis does not
change qualitatively. However, if marginal transport costs are so high that
c˜1 + S˜1 − c˜2 > 0, the low (production) cost firm will lose the foreign market
to its competitor in the punishment phase, but gain increased profits in its
home market due to the higher transport costs of its foreign rival. In this case
it is still the firm in the low-tax country which has the greatest incentive to
defect, and its critical discount factor is
θ¯
S
1 =
(α1 − S˜1)2
[α1 − 2(c˜2 + S˜2 − c˜1)]2
. (26)
Again, we have ∂θ¯1
∂S˜1
< 0, ∂S˜i∂²i > 0, and
∂θ¯1
∂S˜2
> 0, all the other partial eﬀects
remain the same as in previous sections. Hence, we can again apply equation
(25) and the conclusions that followed.
To summarize, we cannot determine unambiguously whether transport
costs weaken collusive behavior. However, our focus has been on tax harmo-
nization and the eﬀects of tax harmonization on the critical discount factors.
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As shown above the eﬀects from harmonization are qualitatively the same as
before, since the leverage eﬀect on overall costs, c˜1 + Si, is strengthened.
5.3 Anti-cartel Action
In our discussion we have omitted the modelling of government fines and
probabilities of detection and the eﬀect such policies may have on tacit col-
lusion. If we incorporated such a structure in our model it would still be the
case that an isolated change in a tax parameter would yield the same results
as in our analysis. The point then is that any tax harmonization eﬀort is
likely to stabilize tacit collusion and therefore thwart anti-cartel aims. Of
course, this eﬀect can in principle be counteracted by a simultaneous change
in anti-cartel instruments. This points to the probable conclusion that tax
harmonization should be limited, or should be followed by a simultaneous
change in anti-cartel instruments.
A possible extension of the model that incorporates fines is as follows.
The government chooses a detection probability p, which is costly (eﬀort),
and a fine F , which is a percentage of the cartel’s profits that has to be paid
if the cartel is revealed. The per-period monopoly profit of a risk neutral firm
when it is a monopolist can be written as
E[Πi] = p · (1− F ) · (1− ti) (a− pi) [pi − c˜i] + (1− p) · (1− ti) (a− pi) [pi − c˜i]
= (1− pF ) · (1− ti) (a− pi) [pi − c˜i] = (1− pF ) · πMi .
Using the same framework for analysis as in previous sections, the critical
discount factor of the low-cost firm is
θ¯i =
πEi
E[Πi]− πDi
=
πEi
(1− pF )πMi − πDi
. (27)
In accordance with the literature on tax evasion, we assume that pF < 1,
since there is an upper bound for the fine due to the costs of monitoring.
Comparing equation (27) to equation (19) it is seen that the set up is equiva-
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lent to that with several countries (n > 2), i.e., Section 5.1. Our results then
do not change given this type of fine structure.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has shown that harmonization of tax rates and tax bases aﬀects
the stability of international cartels and that for the reasonable assumption of
incomplete tax deductible expenses, both bilateral and unilateral harmoniza-
tion stabilizes collusive agreements. Unilateral harmonization to a minimum
standard is preferable to bilateral harmonization in the sense that it has a
smaller eﬀect on the incentive to stay in the cartel. Our results strengthen
previous arguments against tax harmonization in the area of commodity tax-
ation (see Haufler and Schjelderup, 2004).
An issue that has not been explicitly analyzed in this paper is how har-
monization aﬀects international cartels when one firm is located outside the
harmonizing area. The answer to this question, however, follows from our
analysis. Harmonization to a minimum standard, say, on average raises the
tax wedge and thus the eﬀective cost of the low tax firm in the harmoniz-
ing area, thereby reducing its incentive to defect and export into the outside
firm’s market. For the firm located outside the Union, the eﬀect of harmo-
nization depends on its cost (dis-)advantage. If it has lower costs than any
firm located in the Union, harmonization makes it more attractive to export
to the harmonizing area since eﬀective costs there have gone up. Thus profit
in the deviating as well as in the punishment phase of the game has risen.
If the outside firm has higher costs, harmonization in the Union strengthens
the incentive of the outside firm to remain in the cartel. Taken together,
harmonization has a dual eﬀect: on the one hand it stabilizes and segments
cartels within the harmonizing union, but, on the other hand, it may also
decrease or increase the incentive to defect in a market with firms located
outside the harmonizing union. In the latter case, however, for the area that
harmonizes, losing market shares to a foreign firm must be traded oﬀ against
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the benefits to consumers from lower prices.
Appendix
As it is always the low-cost firm which is more likely to leave the cartel, we
have to diﬀerentiate its critical discount factor,
θ¯
m
i =
α2i
α2i − 8αj(c˜j − c˜i)
, (28)
for the changes in tax rates resp. deductibility factors in order to get the
eﬀects of harmonization on cartel stability. This gives
dθ¯
m
i =
∂θ¯
m
i
∂c˜i
· ∂c˜i
∂²i
· ∂²i
∂ti
· dti + ∂θ¯
m
i
∂c˜j
· ∂c˜j
∂²j
· ∂²j
∂tj
· dtj (29)
and
dθ¯
m
i =
∂θ¯
m
i
∂c˜i
· ∂c˜i
∂²i
· ∂²i
∂γi
· dγi +
∂θ¯
m
i
∂c˜j
· ∂c˜j
∂²j
· ∂²j
∂γj
· dγj. (30)
Therefore, we need
∂θ¯
m
i
∂c˜i
= −2αi [α
2
i − 8αj (c˜j − c˜i)] + α2i (6αi − 8(c˜j − c˜i))
[α2i − 8αj (c˜j − c˜i)]
2 < 0 (31)
∂c˜i
∂²i
= c =
∂c˜j
∂²j
> 0 (32)
∂θ¯
m
i
∂c˜j
=
8α2i [αj − (c˜j − c˜i)]
[α2i − 8αj (c˜j − c˜i)]
2 =
8α2i [αi − 2 (c˜j − c˜i)]
[α2i − 8αj (c˜j − c˜i)]
2 > 0, (33)
where the inequality in (31) and (33) holds because αi− 2 (c˜j − c˜i) > 0 from
πE > 0 in equation (5).
Moreover, we have ²i =
1−γiti
1−ti and thus
∂²i
∂γi
= − ti
1− ti
< 0 (34)
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and
∂²i
∂ti
=
1− γi
(1− ti)2
(
> 0 if γi < 1
< 0 if γi > 1
. (35)
References
Abreu, D., 1986. Extremal Equilibria of Oligopoly Supergames, Journal of
Economic Theory 39, 191—225.
Brennan, G., and J. Buchanan, 1980. The Power to Tax: Analytical Foun-
dations of a Fiscal Constitution, Cambridge University Press.
Commission of the European Communities, 2001. Towards an Internal Mar-
ket Without Tax Obstacles, COM (2001), 582 final, 23.
Edwards, J., and M. Keen, 1996. Tax Competition and Leviathan, European
Economic Review 40, 113—134.
European Commission, 1996. A Common System of Value Added Taxa-
tion. A Programme for the Internal Market, Document COM (96) 328.
Brussels.
Froot, K., and P.D. Klemperer, 1989. Exchange Rate Pass-Through when
Market Share Matters, American Economic Review 79, 637—654.
Fudenberg, D., and E. Maskin, 1986. The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games
with Discounting or with Incomplete Information, Econometrica 54,
533—554.
Gendron, P-P., 2001. Corporation Tax Asymmetries and Cartel Unity, In-
ternational Tax and Public Finance 8, 659—674.
Haufler, A., and G. Schjelderup, 2000. Tacit Collusion under destination-
and origin-based commodity taxation. CESifo working paper No. 23,
University of Munich.
26
Haufler, A., and G. Schjelderup, 2004. Tacit Collusion and International
Commodity Taxation, Journal of Public Economics 88, 577—600.
Kanbur, R., and M. Keen, 1993. Jeux sans Frontières: Tax Competition and
Tax Coordination when Countries Diﬀer in Size, American Economic
Review 83, 877—892.
Keen, M., 1987. Welfare Eﬀects of Commodity Tax Harmonization, Journal
of Public Economics 33, 107—114.
Keen, M., 1989. Pareto-Improving Indirect Tax Harmonization, European
Economic Review 33, 1—12.
Keen, M., Lahiri, S., and P. Raimondos-Møller, 1998. When Is Policy Har-
monization Desirable? EPRUworking paper 1998/2, Copenhagen Busi-
ness School.
King, S.P., 1997. National Competition Policy, Economic Record 73, 270—
284.
Lommerud, K.E., and L. Sørgard, 2001. Trade Liberalization and Cartel
Stability, Review of International Economics 9, 343—355.
McLure, C.E, 1986. ”Tax Competition: Is What’s Good for the Private
Goose also Good for the Public Gander? National Tax Journal XXXIX,
341—346.
Martin, S., 1993. Advanced Industrial Organization, Blackwell, Mass.
Marvel, H., 1982. Exclusive Dealing, Journal of Law and Economics 25,
1—26.
Meckl, J., 1996. Market Power of Firms and Exchange Rate Fluctuations,
Journal of Economics 63, 57—77.
Mintz, J., 2004. Corporate Tax Harmonization in Europe: It’s All About
Compliance, International Tax and Public Finance 11, 221—234.
27
Mintz, J., and H. Tulkens, 1986. Commodity Tax Competition Between
Member States of a Federation: Equilibrium and Eﬃciency, Journal of
Public Economics 29, 133—172.
Monti, M., 2001. Why We Should Be Concerned with Cartels and Collusive
Behavior, in: Fighting Cartels - Why and How? Swedish Competition
Authority Individual Chapters (ISBN 91-88566-26-9).
OECD, 2000. Report on Hard Core Cartels.
Pinto, B., 1986. Repeated Games and the Reciprocal Dumping Model of
Trade, Journal of International Economics 20, 357—366.
Rauscher, M., 1998. Leviathan and Competition Among Jurisdictions: The
Case of Benefit Taxation, Journal of Urban Economics 44, 59—67.
Rotemberg, J., and G. Saloner, 1989. Tariﬀs vs. Quotas with Implicit Col-
lusion, Canadian Journal of Economics 22, 237—244.
Scherer, F., 1996. International Trade and Competition Policy, Discussion
paper No. 96-18, Industrial Economics and International Management
Series, Harvard University.
Sinn, H.W., 1987. Capital Income Taxation and Resource Allocation, North-
Holland.
Slade, M., 1995. Empirical Games: The Oligopoly Case, Canadian Journal
of Economics 96, 368—402.
Steen, F., and L. Sørgard, 1999. Semicollusion in the Norwegian Cement
Market, European Economic Review 43, 1775—1796.
Tirole, J., 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organisation, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, Mass.
28
